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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respond·ent, 
vs. 
THEODORE I. GEURTS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9281 
While appellant's statement of facts is fairly ac-
curate, as far as it goes, still it portrays them in a man-
ner most sympathetic to appellant's cause. In addition, 
it fails to set forth many necessary facts, particularly 
those pertaining to Count 2 of the Accusation upon 
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2 
which appellant was found guilty of nmalfeasance in 
office.'' They should be considered in the determina-
tion of this appeal. 
Appellant endeavors to infer that the only thing 
really involved was the taking by Commissioner 
Geurts of three yards of top soil. He then intimates 
that this top soil was merely sprinkled on the roots 
of some trees and shrubs being hauled to his home, 
thereby doing a favor for the city since this en.abled 
the city employees to get rid of them at a location more 
convenient than the City Dump. He fails to mention, 
however, that none of the trees and shrubs were given 
to Commissioner Geurts by the original owners of 
the graves from which they were removed. All the top 
soil, trees and shrubs, with possibly the exception of 
one tree-reverted to the City and could have been 
used in the beautification of the Cemetery or of city 
owned parks. 
Moreover, when the trees and shrubs removed 
from the graves were not used in connection with 
the landscaping and beautification of city prop-
erty, they generally were taken out by attaching a 
chain to them and pulling them out with a truck. 
They then were hauled to a trash pile in the cemetery 
until it was convenient to haul a full truck-load to 
the City Dump. In this case, however, each tree and 
shrub taken to the home of Commissioner Geurts and 
that of his son-in-law was balled, transported and 
placed in holes prepared for it, all of which took 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
the time of at least two city employees working on city 
time and using city equipment. 
Appellant tries to show that the top soil in ques-
tion merely was sprinkled on the roots of the trees and 
shrubs to protect them as they were being hauled in 
the truck to the Commissioner's home. This sugges-
tion is made in spite of the fact that all of the trees and 
shrubs in question had already been balled. Further-
more, regardless of the amount of top soil involved-
and the evidence indicates there was a considerable 
quantity-it took the time and labor of city employ-
ees working on city time and using city equipment to 
dig it OU!t of the mountains, load it, and haul it to the 
City Cemetery; then, to reload it; and finally, to haul 
it to the home of Commissioner Geurts (Tr. 99-127). 
The facts are also that Commissioner Geurts on 
at least one occasion personally directed a city em-
ployee to plant one of the trees (Tr. 125). It is un-
controverted, furthermore, that on another occasion 
he directed one of the city employees to dig up and 
transplant some bridal wreaths for him (Tr. 119). In 
short, in his recitation of facts appellant failed to set 
forth much of the conduct indulged in by Commis-
sioner Geurts which no public official charged with a 
public trust should have done. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellant relies on nine points which respon-
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4 
dent will answer in the same order in which they are 
presented by appellant. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR PURPORTED UNCONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF THE CHARGING STATUTE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS AS TO THE MEANING OF 
THE TERM "MALFEASANCE" IN OF-
FICE. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
AGAINST APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS COUNT I. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TOT AKE DEP-
OSITIONS PRIOR TO TRIAL OR TO 
HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MIS-
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TRIAL AS TO COUNTS 2 AND 3 AND HIS 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
THE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF JUR-
OR WILSON. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE OF ANSWERS GIVEN 
BY JURORS IKEDA AND JENSEN ON 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
CERTAIN QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
FOR PURPORTED UNCONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF THE CHARGING STATUTE. 
One of the points stressed heavily by appellant 
is that the statute under which he was removed from 
office for "malfeasance" is so "vague, indefinite and 
uncertain" as to deny him "due process of law" as 
guaranteed by Section 7 of Article 1 of the Constitu ... 
tion of U tab. 
In a labored effort to support his contention that 
the charging statute is unconstitutional, appellant cites 
several cases dealing with statutes and ordinances 
struck down because they did not recite with sufficient 
particularity the precise conduct which would subject 
the offender to criminal punishment. Those cases are 
not in point here. They deal with criminal statutes 
and ordinances sqbjecting the offender to criminal 
punishment. The statutory provision here involved 
simply is a procedural statute for removal of public 
officers for ''malfeasance in office''. It does not in ... 
volve criminal punishment. 
As pointed out by this Court in Sk'een v. Craig, 
31 Utah 20, 86 Pac. 487, 
"We think it reasonably appears from the 
provisions of the Constitution and Revised 
Statutes referred to, that their object is not to 
punish delinquent and unfaithful public offi-
cers as for crimes, but to protect the public 
against the rapacity and unscrupulousness of 
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such officials, who, by their official miscon-
duct, have forfeited their right to continue in 
the positions of public trust to which they have 
been elected or appointed.'' 
Appellant suggests that if the Legislature wanted 
to make provision for the removal of public officers 
for "malfeasance in office" it should have laid down 
standards of conduct by which a person reading the 
statute could determine what was intended. Appel-
lant fails to mention and possibly even failed to con-
sider that it was not the Legislature which provided 
that pu4blic officers should be removed for "malfeas-
ance", but the framers of the Constitution. 
Article VI, Section 19 of the Constitution of 
U tab provides in part as follows: 
''The Governor and other State and Judi-
cial officers, except Justices of the Peace, shall 
be liable to impeachment for high crimes, mis-
demeanors or malfeasance in office * * * 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Section 21 of that same Article then provides as fol--
lows: 
"All officers not liable to impeachment 
shall b·e removed for any of the offenses speci-
fied in this article, in such manner as may be 
provided by law." (Emphasis supplied.) 
''Malfeasance in office,'' then, is one of the of-
fenses for which the Constitution declares public offi-
cers "shall be removed." Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah 
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Code Annotated 1953, merely establishes the method 
and procedure for their removal. It is only this pro-
cedural statute that appellant attacks as unconstitu-
tional. He does not attack or even mention the con-
stitutional provision which requires that p~blic offi-
cers shall be removed for ''malfeasance in office''. 
The term "malfeasance in office" is a recognized 
common law offense and a term of long usage. Courts 
consistently uphold statutory provisions as being suf ... 
ficiently certain if they employ terms of long us.age or 
with a recognized common law meaning. Connolly v. 
General Canst. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 
70 L. Ed. 322; International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 216, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284; 
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S. Ct. 700, 
57 L. Ed. 1232. 
The Constitutional Convention and the members 
of the Legislature which enacted the statute recognized 
that the term "malfeasance in office" was one of long 
usage and one designating a common law offense. This 
is shown by the fact that the Constitution states in 
Section 21 of Article VI, without further definition or 
clarification that all officers not liable to impeachment 
"shall be removed" for any of the offenses specified in 
this article, (including Section 19) and by what the 
Legislature did in carrying out its constitutional man-
date to provide a method and procedure for removal 
for malfeasance. 
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The Legislature further provided in Section 76-
1-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, that, 
''The omission to specify or affirm in this 
Code any ground of forfeiture of a public of-
fice, or other trust or special authority conferred 
by law, or any power conferred by law to im-
peach, remove, depose or suspend any public 
officer or other person holding any trust, ap-
pointment or other special authority conferred 
by law, does not affect such forfeiture or power, 
or any proceeding authorized by law to carry 
into effect such impeachment, removal, deposi-
tion or suspension.'' 
It is a fqndamental rule of constitutional con-
struction that terms employed therein must be given 
the meaning which they possessed at the time of the 
framing and adoption of the instrument. Courts must 
give effect to constitutional provisions according to 
their language and obvious intent. Utah Builders, 
Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 250, 39 P. 2d 327, 
103 A. L. R. 928. Nothing could be plainer than that 
the framers of the Utah Constitution intended that 
public officers should be removed from office for 
''malfeasance in office'' in such manner as provided by 
law. 
The common law recognized ''malfeasance in 
office'' as a public offense, and the meaning which 
that term possessed at the time of the adoption of that 
instrument is the meaning which mutst still be placed 
upon it. The Legislature very wisely refrained from 
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detailing all the various and sundry acts which might 
constitute "malfeasance in office", first, because of the 
almost impossible task of doing so, and second, be-
cause they were proscribed in interpreting that term 
differently than the common law meaning it had ac-
quired at the framing and adoption of the Constitu-
tion. It must be presumed that the framers of the Con-
stitution drafted it with utmost care and with a full 
and complete understanding of the terms employed 
therein. 
Mere difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of 
words will not invalidate a statute. Pacific Coast 
Dairy v. Police Court, (Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80 
A. L. R. 1172. To make a statute sufficiently certain 
to comply with the constitutional requirements it is 
not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifi-
cations of the acts or conduct prohibited. As pointed 
out by Justice Crockett in State v. Packard, 122 Ut. 
369, 250 P. 2d 561, ''The limitations of language are 
such that neither absolute exactitude of expression nor 
complete precision of meaning are to be expected and 
such standard cannot be required." 
True, this does not relieve the Legislature from 
the necessity of setting fair and understandable stan-
dards of conduct, but this, we contend, was properly 
done in enacting the statute in question. 
Since the test of constitutional legislation in this 
area is similar in most jurisdictions, respondent hopes 
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to provide some assistance to the court by citing several 
leading cases in other states. 
While the matter before the court was civil with 
criminal procedure, the statements below are applic~ 
able here in that a lesser standard is required in civil 
actions than in criminal ones, and if the statute in 
question satisfies the constitutional requirements as to 
criminal proceedings, it certainly satisfies them as to 
those civil in nature. 
To comply with the constitutional requirements 
of du~ process of law, the crime for which a defendant 
is being prosecuted must be clearly defined, but it is 
only necessary that the words used in the statute be 
well enough known to enable those persons within its 
reach to understand and correctly apply them. 
"To make a statute sufficiently certain to 
comply with constitutional requirements, it is 
not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and 
specifications of acts or conduct prohibited." 
People v. Smith, (Cal.), 92 P. 2d 1039. 
For example, the courts have upheld statutes em-
ploying such terms as "to make diligent effort to find 
the owner'', Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court, 
(Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80 A. L. R. 1217; "unreason-
able speed", Ex Parte Daniels, (Cal.), 192 P. 442, 21 
A. L. R. 1172, "unjustifiable physical pain or mental 
suffering", People v. C.urtis, (Cal.), 300 P. 801; 
"practice law", Peopl'e v. Ring, (Cal.), 70 P. 2d 281; 
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and "to the annoy,ance of any other person", People 
V. Beifuss, (Cal.), 67 P. 2d 411. 
It is contended that the section is uncertain, vague 
and indefinite; that in defining an offense the legisla-
ture must use language that will not deceive the com-
mon mind. 
The answer to such contention is that it is neces .. 
sary only that the words used in the statute be well 
enough known to enable those persons within its reach 
to understand and correctly apply them. To make a 
statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitu-
tional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish 
detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct 
prohibited. Lorenson v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 216 
P. 2d 859. 
"In determining whether a penal statute is 
sufficiently explicit to inform those who are 
subject to it what is required by them, the courts 
must endeavor, if possible, to view the statute 
from the standpoint of the reasonable man who 
might be subject to its terms." Pacific Coast 
Dairy v. Police Court of the City and County 
of San Francisco, (Cal.), 8 P. 2d 140, 80 A. 
L. R. 1217. 
Inasmuch as the language employed in the stat-
ute under attack is clear and the words are such as a 
person of average intelligence can understand, it must 
be held that there is no want of certainty or definite-
ness about it. 
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But mere difficulty in ascertaining the meaning 
of words employed or the fact that the language is am-
biguous will not invalidate a statute. Pacific Coast 
Dairy v. Police Court, supra. 
It must be tvpheld unless its nullity clearly, posi-
tively and unmistakably appears. Lockhe·ed Aircraft 
Corporation v. Superior Court, (Cal.), 171 P. 2d 21, 
166 A. L. R. 701. Neither is a statute void for vague-
ness and uncertainty if its meaning may be inferred or 
because the legislative intent might have been declared 
in plainer terms. 50 Am. Jur. 489, 490; Hunt v. 
State, (Ind.), 146 N. E. 329; People V. Darby, 
(Cal.), 250 P. 2d 74 3. 
The acts and conduct of appellant were set forth 
with meticulous detail and particularity. It would be 
difficult to find a reasonable person who would not 
immediately recognize the presence of "malfeasance" 
on the part of a pwblic official who wilfully and cor-
ruptly received for his perso·nal gain and benefit trees, 
shrubs and top soil hauled to his home by city employ-
ees working on city time and using city equipment and 
who directed that at least one of the trees be planted 
by a city employee and that another city employee 
dig up and transplant some other shrubbery in his 
yard. Such a series of acts so clearly comes within the 
scope of "malfeasance" on the part of a public official 
as to require little further comment. 
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The statute providing for the removal of public 
officers for "malfeasance in office" is not so vague, in-
definite and uncertain as to be unconstitutional. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS AS TO THE MEANING OF 
THE TERM "MALFEASANCE" IN OF-
FICE. 
Closely related to his first point is his second, that 
the instru,:tion given to the jury as to the meaning of 
"malfeasance" was so vague, uncertain and indefinite 
as to force the jury to rely upon a purely subjective 
standard. Appellant argues that ''perhaps one member 
of a jury might think a Commissioner should attend 
every Commission meeting, and that a commissioner 
was guilty of malfeasance if he were absent for a day''. 
Appellant concludes his argument on this point by 
stating that "malfeasance requires a guilty knowledge 
and an intent to do wrong in all cases and not mere 
inadvertence, negligence or even failure to know the 
1 '' aw . 
It is difficult to conceive of language which 
would more perfectly meet the requirements suggested 
by appellant for properly defining "malfeasance" than 
the language which actually was employed in this 
case. Count 2 of the Accusation as modified by the 
Bill of Particulars was precise and exact as to the acts 
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constituting the ''malfeasance" of appellant. The 
Court thereafter defined the term ''malfeasance'' in 
language, as appellant himself concedes, taken from 
other cases decided by this Court, which language, in-
cidentally, embraced the common law definition of 
that term. The Court then went on to instruct the 
jury in No. 3 as follows (R. 44) : 
·'Before you are warranted in finding the 
defendant guilty as to Count 2, the State must 
prove to your satisfaction and beyond a reason-
able doubt the following elements which con-
stitute the accusations set forth therein: 
1. That said defendant from on or about Feb-
ruary 1, 19 59, did wilful! y and corruptly 
receive for his personal gain, benefit and ad-
vantage certain property belonging to Salt 
Lake City Corporation; or, 
2. That said defendant during said time afore-
said did wilfully and corruptly receive for 
his personal gain, benefit and advantage the 
labor of Salt Lake City employees while 
they were regularly employed by Salt Lake 
City Corporation in and during the regular 
course and scope of their employment, for 
which labor they were paid out of Salt Lake 
City funds; or, 
3. The wrongful use of Salt Lake City equip-
ment; 
4. That during the period of time stated afore-
said defendant was the duly elected, quali-
fied and acting Commissioner of the City 
of Salt Lake, State of Utah; 
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5. That said act, or acts, by the said defen-
dant at the time and place charged herein 
was done consciously as a wrongful act in 
his official capacity with the knowledge 
upon his part at the time of doing the same 
that it was wrongful and that he had no 
right to do the same, or in lieu of said 
wrongful act, the defendant did an unlaw-
ful act. 
nit is not sufficient that the State prove 
one or more of these elements but it is necessary, 
in order to justify a finding against the defen-
dant on said Count that each and every one of 
the elements enumerated in Cournt 2, and, one 
or more of the alternative elements aforesaid be 
proven to your satisfaction and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Upon failure of proof of the 
elements as aforesaid beyond a reasonable doubt 
the defendant is entitled to an acquittal." 
This instruction certainly did not, as appellant asserts 
in his brief at page 24, leave it up to the members of 
the jury to determine whether under their own stan-
dards of right and wrong appellant was guilty of 
''malfeasance in office''. 
The court then cautioned the jury even further 
in Instruction No. 6 (R. 49): 
"You· are instructed that in order to au-
thorize a removal from office, the act of which 
the officer is accused must be positively unlaw-
ful, or must involve some evil or wrongdoing 
on his part which must be known to him to be 
so when the act is committed. To commit the 
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act of malfeasance in office it is not necessary 
that he be convicted of a crime, or that he have 
a criminal intent at the time of committing the 
act, unless the act committed and relied upon 
for malfeasance is a crime, in which case he must 
have a criminal intent, nor is it necessary that 
the defendant have an intent to defraud at the 
time of committing the act in question.'' 
·'As you will observe from these instruc-
tions there are several ways of committing mal-
feasance in office. One way is to commit an act 
that is wrongful in which there must exist a 
showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant at the time of committing the wrong-
ful act knew that the act so committed was 
wrongful and that he had no right to commit 
the same.'' 
''Second! y, if the act committed is evil the 
same sho~ving of conscious wrongdoing must 
likevvise exist in the mind of the perpetrator at 
the time of the commission of the act. This, 
and the commission of the act in question, must 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt in all sit-
. ,, 
uat1ons. 
"Thirdly, if the act relied upon by the 
State to constitute the malfeasance in office con-
sists of the commission of a crime, then the per-
petrator must commit acts constituting all the 
elements that go to make up the crime involved; 
namely, the commission of the unlawful act, the 
intent to commit the act, and a knowledge upon 
the part of the perpetrator that the commission 
of the act is a crime. This latter element the law 
imputes to every person because the law con-
conclusively presumes that all persons know the 
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law and ignor:ance thereof is no defense or ex-
'' cuse. 
"It is therefore necessary, to warrant a 
conviction of malfeasance in office, that the 
State prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of 
the elements enumerated in each instance above. 
In the event there is a failure upon the part of 
State to prove each and all of the said elements 
constituting the malfeasance relied upon, then 
the .defendant is entitled to a verdict of not 
guilty." 
The Court further instructed the jury that mere mis-
takes in judgment .and their personal opinions as to 
the proper conduct of the office had no place in their 
deliberations. In Instruction No. 7 the Court said in 
part ( R. 5 1 ) : 
''To ju~tify the removal of a public offi-
cer for malfeasance in office as a result of high 
crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance commit-
ted by him it is necessary for the State to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the act which 
the defendant has been accused of is positively 
unlawful or involves some evil or wrongdoing 
on his part which must be known to him to be 
such when he committed the act or acts." 
''In other words, mere mistake in judg-
ment or unorthodox handling of public affairs 
would not justify removal from office. Your 
personal opinions as jurors as to whether or not 
the defendant has conducted the office as it 
should be conducted or whether or not he 
shou'ld be re-elected to this post have no place 
in your deliberations. Unless you believe be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the accused has 
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been guilty of offenses done with an evil mo-
tive or conscious wrongdoing, or an act that is 
unlawful, you should acquit him on all of these 
counts.'' 
It must be presumed that the jury followed the 
foregoing instructions of the District Court. Con-
trary to the assertions of appellant, the jury could not 
possibly have found that he was guilty of "malfeas-
ance in office" for "being absent for a day", deciding a 
discretionary matter in "one way whereas he should 
have decided it in another way", for mere "inadver-
tence'' or for ''negligence'' as the appellant argues. 
The instructions as given represent a most con-
scientious and realistic application of the facts in this 
case to what would constitute the common law offense 
of "malfeasance in office". A careful reading of those 
instructions evidences the care and skill exercised by 
the District Judge in putting them into understandable 
language. 
Appellant concedes that the instruction given ob 
viously was picked from language used in Law v. 
Smith, 34 Utah 395, 98 Pac. 300. In describing the 
various offenses for which a public officer could be 
removed from office Judge Frick had this to say: 
''Both under the Constitution and under 
the statute it is provided that officers of the 
class to which respondent belongs may be re-
moved upon three grounds, namely, for high 
crimes, for misdemeanors, and for malfeasance 
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in office. It therefore was not intended that, 
before an officer is subject to removal from 
office, he must be found guilty of some high 
crime or misdemeanor; but, if he is found 
guilty of some act or acts which constitute mal-
feasance in o{fice, it is sufficient to remove him. 
In order to authorize a removal from office, 
however, the act of which the officer is accused 
must be positively unlawful, or must involve 
some evil or wrongdoing on his part which 
must be known to him to be so when the act 
is committed.'' 
In 43 Am. Jur. at page 39, the term "malfeas-
ance'' is defined as follows: 
'' * * * Malfeasance, as ground for 
removal of a public officer, has reference to evil 
conduct or an illegal deed, the doing of that 
which one ought not to do, the performance of 
any act by an officer in his official capacity that 
is wholly illegal and wrongful. * * *" 
Without any apparent constitutional qualms the 
Supreme Court of Florida said in State ex ref. Hardie 
v. Coleman, 155 So. 129, 
''Malfeasance has reference to evil conduct 
or an illegal deed, the doing of that which one 
ought not to do, the performance of an act by 
an officer in his official capacity that is wholly 
illegal and wrongful, which he has no right to 
perform or which he has contracted not to do. 
Words and Phrases, First, Second, Third and 
Fourth Series, malfeasance; Webster's New ln-
terna tional Dictionary.'' 
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In Sims v. Moeur, 19 P. 2d 679, the Arizona 
Supreme Court adopted as its legal definition of mal-
feasance the following expression: 
''Evil doing; ill conduct; tbe commission 
of some act which is positively unlawful; the 
doing of an act which is wholly wrongful and 
unlawful; the doing of an act which the per-
son ought not to do at all." 
See also People v. Schnieder, (Colo.), 292 P. 
982; State v. Langley. (Ore.), 323 P. 2d 301; 
Daugherty v. E !lis, (W. V a.), 9 7 S. E. 2d 3 3; State, 
ex rel. Atty. General v. Lazarus, (La.), 1 So. 3 61; 
Lawhorn v. Robertson. (Okla.), 266 P. 2d 1008; 
Beck v. Young, (Neb.), 48 N. W. 2d 677; Wyson v. 
Walden, (W.Va.), 52 S. E. 2d 392; State v. Ellen-
stein. (N.J.), 2 A. 2d 454; State v. Winne, (N.J.), 
91 A. 2d 65; State v. Ward, (Tenn.), 4 3 S. W. 2d 
21 7; and the cases decided by this Cou·rt and cited by 
appellant and respondent. 
An additional allegation of error in appellant's 
Point II is that the court below failed to establish a 
proper standard of right and wrong. Appellant s.ays 
malfeasance requires actual guilty knowledge and in-
tent to do wrong in all cases. 
This does not appear to be the current law in 
this jurisdiction. Atwood v. CoxJ 88 Ut. 437, 55 P. 
2d 377, a case decided later than the Law case, indi-
cates that such knowledge might be imputed in using 
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the following words at page 393: "* * * that 
he must have done so knowing that he was doing 
wrong or at least under such circumsttnces that any 
reasonable person who had done the same thing would 
have known that he was doing something wrong.'' 
The jury was properly instructed and no error 
was committed harmful or detrimental to the substan-
tial rights of appellant. There was no prejudice. 
POINT Ill. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING 
AGAINST APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS COUNT I. 
It is urged that the District Court erred in not 
dismissing Count 1 of the accusation for the reasons, 
first, that it was "res adjudicata" and second, that 
''the same reasons for dismissal that were present in 
the criminal cases were present in the civil case". 
The argument asserting "res adjudicata" as a 
reason for dismissing Count 1 of the Accusation is 
without merit. Count 1 of the Indictment was part 
of Criminal Case No. 16525 charging appellant with 
commission of a misdemeanor as set forth in Title 10, 
Chapter 6, Section 36, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Count 1 of the Accusation, on the other hand, was 
part of civil Case No. 124 396, charging appellant 
with "malfeasance in office", brought solely for the 
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purpose of removing him from office under our re-
moval statute, Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. 
The Utah Constitution, providing for removal 
of public officers by "impeachment", states in part in 
Section 19 of Article VI, 
''* * * judgment in such cases shall 
extend only to removal from office and disqual-
ification to hold any office of honor, trust or 
profit in the State. The party, whether con-
victed or acquitted, shall, neverth'eless, be liable 
to prosecution, trial and punishment according 
to law.,, (Emphasis supplied.) 
While the constitutional provision quoted above 
appears in Section 19 dealing with removal of officers 
by "impeachment" and not in Section 21 dealing with 
the removal of officers "in such manner as may be pro-
vided by Law,'' still, it certain! y would be a ridiculou~ 
anomaly if an officer removed by "impeachment" 
should be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment 
according to law, while an officer removed "in such 
manner as may be provided by Law" should not be 
so liable. 
The framers of the Constitution and the mem-
bers of the Legislature were in accord, moreover, that 
public officers removed for "malfeasance in office" 
should be liable to prosecution, trial and punishment 
regardless of their manner of removal. Upon convic-
tion under Title 77, Chapter 7, Utah Code Anno-
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tated, 1953, the Legislature provided in Section 15, 
that "the Court must entc1 a judgment that the party 
accused be deprived of his office", and then in Section 
16, that, 
"Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to prevent the officers mentioned from 
being proceeded against by information or in-
dictment for a public offense in the same man-
ner as is provided by law for so proceeding 
against other persons accused of a public of-
fense.' 
Appellant himself concedes that for "res adjudi-
cata" to apply, three conditions must exist: The ac-
tions must be bet\\reen the same parties, the issues must 
be the same, and, the relief sought must be the same. 
Those conditions did not exist. 
The Indictment was a criminal action. Upon 
conviction thereunder appellant could have been sub-
jected to a fine u!p to $1,000.00. The Accusation was 
only a removal proceeding. Conviction thereunder 
could not have subjected appellant to a fine but only 
to removal from office. 
The removal statute is primarily for the purpose 
of protecting citizens of a particular body politic. It 
was not written with the purpose of punishing a pub-
lic official and/ or subjecting him to a possible fine as is 
the case in a criminal statute. 
The Utah case, Sk~en v. Craig, 86 P. 487, sheds 
some light on the res adjudicata question. It holds 
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that proceedings under a statute virtually identical to 
.... (\ I • 
the one involved here are of a civil natu-re even though 
containing some criminal procedural steps and that the 
relief sought is entirely different than in a criminal 
case. A discussion of these matters appears at page 
488: 
"We think it reasonably appears from the 
provisions of the Constitution and Revised 
Statutes referred to, that their object is not to 
punish delinquent and unfaithful public offi-
cers as for crimes, but to protect the public 
against the rapacity and unscrupulousness of 
such officials, who, by their official miscon-
duct, have forfeited their right to continue in 
the positions of public trust to which they have 
been elected or appointed. And it would seem 
that, if the object of such proceedings brought 
under section 4580 were to punish for the com-
mission of crime, some judgment, other than 
that of removal from office only, would have 
been provided for and provision made in the 
same act for the prosecution of offending offi-
cers whose misconduct might escape detection 
until after the expiration of their terms of of-
f . * * *" tee. 
Since one of the proceedings was criminal and the 
other civil, even without the aforesaid positive consti-
tutional and legislative declarations that a public offi-
cial convcted or acquitted under a removal proceeding 
shall nevertheless be liable to criminal prosecution and 
punishment, the argument of appellant as to "res ad-
judicata" is still without merit. 
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The matter here involved would still appear to 
fall squarely within the general rule that a judgment 
rendered in a criminal action may not be received in 
evidence in a subsequent civil action to bar such action 
or to establish the truth of the facts upon which it was 
rendered, 30 Am. Jur. 1005. 
There is no merit either to the second part of 
appellant's argument on this point that the count 
should have been dismissed for the same reasons the 
similar count in the Indictment was dismissed. In 
substance the Accusation charged appellant with wil-
fully and corruptly having a personal interest in a 
contract with the city. Appellant insinuates that this 
was a veiled charge of bribery when in fact the only 
charge is that he had a personal interest in a con tract 
with the city which is prohibited by the provisions of 
Section 10-6-38 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, read-
ing as follows: 
"No officer of any municipal corporation 
shall be directly or indirect I y in teres ted in any 
contract * * * the * * * consid-
eration of which is paid from the treasury 
* * * tt . 
Without detailing the evidence adduced, it is re-
spectfully submitted that there was ample and sub-
stantial evidence from which the jury could have 
found appellant guilty. Few if any officials actually 
guilty would ever admit their interest and guilt. This 
must be ascertained from all the facts and circum-
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stances and the reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom. This is a factual determination and should 
have been decided by the jury under proper instruc-
tions. As said by this Court in Law v. Smith, 34 Ut. 
394, 98 P. 300, 
"It was for the jury to say, after consid-
ering all of the evidence produced in support of 
the accusation * * *.'' 
In that regard, our system of jurisprudence has, 
from earliest times, contemplated that a jury of a 
man's peers should find the facts of his case, not the 
ju!.dge. It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the facts whether the evidence offered be 
weak or strong, in conflict or uncontroverted. This 
applies to both civil and criminal cases and so covers 
the matter at hand. State v. Green, 78 Ut. 580, 6 P. 
2d 177. 
Certainly appellant was not prejudiced since the 
Count was dismissed and any possible error thereafter 
was cured by the remarks of the Judge at the time and 
by his subsequent instruction. He told the Court: 
"Gentlemen of the jury, at the end of the 
State's case, the defendant made a motion to 
dismiss this first count that is charge.d against 
the defendant, and I have considered it during 
the noon hour and have come to the conclusion 
that I would not be warranted in submitting it 
to you for your deliberations and determina~ 
tion, for the reason that there is not evidence 
that supports the necessary elements of that 
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charge. And I am, therefore, dismissing it and 
withdrawng it from your consideration." 
"So you will devote your attention to the 
second and third counts as they are charged in 
the accusation and counsel for the defendant 
may now proceed to put on their evidence 
* * *." (Tr. 190-191.) 
The Judge then in Instruction No. 4 stated: 
4 4 
* * * You are instructed, gentle-
men of the jury, that you have heard much evi-
dence respecting the first count of this accu5a-
tion and you have also been informed that the 
same has been dismissed by me upon motion of 
the defendant's counsel. You are, therefore, 
instructed that you should disregard all of the 
evidence that pertains to that count in your de-
liberations upon the guilt or innocence of the 
defendant respecting counts No. 2 and 3 as now 
contained in the accusation. * * *" (R. 
47.) 
Moreover, the fact that the court forthright! y 
dismissed Count 1 may have had just the opposite 
effect wpon the jury than that contended by appellant. 
The jury, upon hearing the court dismiss the count, 
may very well have become impressed not only with 
the weakness of that particular count, but with the 
State's case generally and have become somewhat more 
inclined to rule in appellant's favor upon the counts 
submitted to it. This theory is enhanced somewhat 
by the actual fact that the jury did bring in a verdict 
in favor of appellant as to Count 3 despite the clear 
evidence introduced by the State. 
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Respondent feels strongly that Count 1 should 
have been submitted to the jury under proper instruc-
tions for their determination as to the guilt or inno-
cence of appellant. If any error did occur, however, 
it certainly was not prejudicial under the cautionary 
remarks and instructions given. As pointed out by 
this Court in State v. Neal, 1 Ut. 2d 122, 262 P. 2d 
756, 
''We are also conscious of the fact that a 
trial in the Courts of this state is a proceeding 
in the interest of justice to determine the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, and not just a 
game. We will not reverse criminal cases for 
mere error or irregularity. It is only where 
there has been error which is both substantial 
and prejudicial to the rights of the accused that 
a reversal is warranted.'' 
These remarks are equally applicable in civil cases such 
as this, as they are in criminal rna tters. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TOT AKE DEP-
OSITIONS PRIOR TO TRIAL OR TO 
HAVE A PRELl MINAR Y HEARING. 
Appellant's argument that the trial Court com-
mitted error in denying him a preliminary hearing or 
the right to take depositions prior to trial is without 
merit. 
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Only by statute is a person entitled to a prelim-
inary hearing. The Utah law gives a person charged 
with crime by complaint and information that right. 
but specifically denies it to a public official in a re-
moval proceeding. Section 77-1-4 Utah Code Anno-
tated 19 53, provides in part that, 
"Every public offense must be prosecuted 
by information after examination and commit-
ment by a magistrate unless the examination is 
waived by the accused with the consent of the 
state, or by indictment, with or without such 
examination and commitment, except: 
( 1) Where proceedings are had for 
the removal of a civil officer of the state, 
of a political subdivision thereof, of a 
municipality or of a school district.'' (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
The removal statute itself does not grant an offi-
cer accused of "malfeasance in office" the right to a 
preliminary hearing, nor does it assure the use of dep-
ositions. It is a special type of proceeding. Its pur-
pose is to protect the public by providing for the ex-
peditious removal of officials found guilty of "mal-
feasance in office''. It is not designed to try persons 
charged with the commission of crime as in a criminal 
proceeding, nor is it designed to adjudicate private 
rights of individuals as in the usual civil proceeding. 
Commissioner Geurts, on being accwed of ''mal-
feasance in office" in the case ,at bar, was entitled to 
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be informed in the Accusation itself in clear and concise 
language of the very acts relied upon as constituting 
that offense, which acts in and of themselves must, 
as a matter of law, constitute the offense. Law v. 
Smith, 34 Ut. 394, 98 Pac. 300. 
The Accusation against him met all legal require-
ments. In addition he was furnished a Bill of Partic-
ulars which set forth with even more particularity the 
details and evidence of his acts of malfeasance. 
It is clear from a careful reading of the removal 
statute and the decisions of this Court thereunder that 
the "accusation" takes the place of the "preliminary 
hearing''. The acc~ation must in and of itself set 
forth in clear and concise language those acts which 
constitute the common law offense of "malfeasance in 
office''. If it does not, the proceeding for removal can 
be enjoined by writ of prohibition. See Burke V. 
Knox, 59 Ut. 596, 206 P. 711. In this case appellant 
sought such writs on two occasions from this Court 
and both of them were denied. 
The right to take depositions is a right granted 
only in civil proceedings governed by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. The removal statute does not grant 
the right to take depositions. Nor are they otherwise 
provided for by rule, since the removal statute must 
be enforced only in accordance with the Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure. Appellant was not harmed in any 
way by being denied the right to take them. This is 
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very clearly pointed out by appellant's own words at 
pages 2 7 through 2 9 of his brief. The court should 
take particular notice of the following quotation from 
page 28: 
''Counsel for the defense was certain in his 
own mind that the district attorney had no such 
evidence, as we believed that we had talked to 
all of the witnesses that knew anything about 
this particular rna tter. According! y, we filed a 
demand with the district attorney for a list of 
all of the witnesses whom he would use to 
prove Count 1 (R. 8). * * *" 
In other words, counsel for appellant had already 
obtained all the information necessary to the prosecu-
tion of his case since he had interviewed all of the wit-
nesses. There remained the further opportunity, more-
over, to talk with all witnesses whose names might 
thereafter be turned over by the district attorney in 
response to his demand. 
Appellant claims, too, that he knew in advance 
what evidence would be introduced as to CoUlnt 1 and 
that, in fact, it came into the trial just as he knew it 
would (A. B. 28). Counsel does not profess to be a 
mind reader and this knowledge could only have been 
obtained by careful scrutiny of the State's witnesses. 
Therefore, no depositions were necessary nor 
could they have given any further light to appellant 
beyond what he professed to have. 
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POINT V. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A MIS-
TRIAL AS TO COUNTS 2 AND 3 AND HIS 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
In appellant's contention that the District Court 
committed error in not granting a mistrial as to 
Counts 2 and 3 and in not granting his motion for a 
new trial, he presents nothing not already presented in 
his arguments at his Points III and IV. The denial of 
his motion for a mistrial and of his motion for a new 
trial was not an abuse of discretion by the trial Judge. 
The rule that this Court will not reverse a ruling of 
a District Court unless there is a gross abuse of discre-
tion has been announced so often as to need no cita-
tion of authority. Clearly there was no abuse of dis-
cretion. The substantial rights of appellant were not 
prejudiced. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
THE CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE OF JUR-
OR WILSON. 
Rule 47f(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure covers the question presented and dealt with un-
der this point. 
" ( 6) That a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference to the cause, 
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or to either party, which would prevent him 
from acting impartially and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the party challeng-
ing; but no person shall be disqualified as a 
juror by reason of having formed or expressed 
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be sub-
mitted to such jury, founded upon public 
rumor, statements in p~blic journals or com-
mon notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the 
Court that the juror can and will, notwith-
standing such opinion, act impartially and fair-
ly upon the matter to be submitted to him." 
The following portion of the transcript contain-
ing the questions of the trial Judge and the answers 
given by Wilson will clearly show that the Judge acted 
well within his discretion in denying the challenge for 
cause to juror Wilson (Tr. 20-23): 
"THE COURT: Mr. Wilson, what is 
your occupation? 
''MR. WILSON: I am retired. 
''THE COURT: And before you retired, 
what did you do? 
'MR. WILSON: I worked in the whole-
sale lumber business for the Utah Lu,mber Com-
pany. 
"THE COURT: And I presume you 
have heard through the press and radio and 
some discussions, publications of City affairs 
and probably about the filing of this accusa-
tion, have you? 
"MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, I have. 
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"THE COURT: And from what you 
have read and heard and general gossip and 
talk, have you formed or expressed any opinion 
about the merits of this case? 
"MR. WILSON: Not to anybody except 
my own family. I might say that I was quite 
greatly concerned about the accusations that 
were made at the time. 
"THE COURT: And I don't want to 
know what your opinion is, if you; have one. 
I say we don't want to know what it is, but 
do you at this time have an opinion about the 
truth or falsity of these accusations? 
"MR. WILSON: I have an opinion but 
I might be able to change it in case the evidence 
showed it wrong. 
"THE COURT: Do you believe that it 
would require evidence to remove the opinion 
that you have now? 
''MR. WILSON: I think so. 
"THE COURT: Do you agree with the 
rule of law that a man is presumed innocent 
until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt? 
"MR. WILSON: Yes, sir, I do. 
''THE COURT: And you likewise agree 
with the rule of law that if the State should 
prove the truth or accuracy of these accusations 
that they are entitled to have a finding made in 
their favor? 
''MR. WILSON: That is right. I believe 
it. 
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"THE COURT: And if you were ac-
cepted as a juror, would you conduct your dut-
ies as a juror along those lines? 
~~MR. WILSON: I would do so. 
"THE COURT: I take it from the ques-
tions you have answered that you now are of 
the opinion that a man is presumed innocent 
until he is proved guilty? 
"MR. WILSON: Thaf s true, yes, sir. 
"THE COURT: Do you think you 
would require more proof of guilt in this in-
stance than you would in any other case where 
the same rule of law applied? 
''MR. WILSON: Well, I think it is quite 
an important case, and I think it should have 
sufficient proof, yes. 
''THE COURT: Well, Mr. Wilson, I 
have made this statement to many jurors, that 
every case is important. It all depends upon 
who is involved. That is, it is important to the 
people that are involved. This case is important 
to the State of Utah, and it is important to 
Commissioner Geurts, but the case tomorrow 
will be important to the State or some defen-
dant there and we should treat every case as 
important. But the thing I want to know from 
the statement you have made is whether or not 
you think this case is of such a nature that you 
would require more proof in this instance than 
you would in a case tomorrow involving some 
other defendant, maybe involving the same 
charge? 
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"MR. WILSON: Well, if I say yes, I 
would say it is because I think public officials 
should be above reproach in whatever office 
they have been elected to, and that there should 
be no suspicion or anything of that kind. 
"THE COURT: Well, nobody can quar-
rel with your statement, but that is not an of-
fense or it is not a ground for removal if a man 
is not above suspicion. It must be stronger than 
that. It must be that he is guilty of wrongdoing 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Now you would 
not find this defendant, the issue for or against 
him on the matter of suspicion, would you? 
"MR. WILSON: No, sir. 
''THE COURT: In other words, suspi-
cion really has nothing to do with the trial of 
this case. 
"MR. WILSON: That's right. 
"THE COURT: It is the question of 
whether he is or is not guilty of these accusa-
tions. 
"MR. WILSON: I understand that. 
"THE COURT: And even though a 
man may be indiscreet or may have done some-
thing that you don't approve of, you would 
not hold that against him from the standpoint 
of finding this issue against him, would you-? 
''MR. WILSON: I would not. 
"THE COURT: Do you have any men-
tal reservation about whether or not you should 
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sit as a juror in this case, as concerns your im-
partiality? 
"MR. WILSON: No, sir. 
~~THE COURT: And if you were a de-
fendant in this case do you think you would 
get a fair and impartial trial if you were sitting 
on the jury and seven others like you? 
"MR. WILSON: I would think so." 
31 Am. Jur. 183, pg. 217 states the general rule 
as follows: 
"According to the majority rule which is 
sometimes incorporated in a statutory enact-
ment, a juror who states on his examination 
that he has formed and expressed an opinion 
about the case which it would take evidence to 
remove but who states that he can fairly and 
impartially try the case according to the law 
and the evidence, and render a true verdict, is 
competent to act as a juror, where the court or 
triors are satisfied of the truth of his statements. 
It is quite natural for prospective jurors to say, 
under such conditions, that it would require 
some evidence to change their former impres-
sions, but it does not follow that such condition 
of mind renders them incompetent.'' 
In Thiede v. People of th'e Territory of Utah, 
159 U. S. 510, a murder case, four jurors testified 
that they had read newspaper accounts of the killing 
and had formed impressions from them, but each 
stated he could lay aside such impressions and try the 
case fairly. At that time, the territory had a statute 
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similar to our Rule 4 7f ( 6). The court held that the 
jurors clearly came within the terms of the statute and 
no error occurred. 
To the same effect is the case of Hopt v. Utah, 7 
S. Ct. 614, 120 U.S. 430. It also held that the judg-
ment of the court as to the competency of the juror, 
upon his declarations under the statute then in effect, 
w:as conclusive. 
In Leick v. People, (Cal.), 323 P. 2d 674, a 
murder trial, a juror admitted having an opinion at 
the time of the voir dire examination, but said he could 
disregard the opinion, listen to the evidence and apply 
it to the instructions of the court and that he would 
be fair and impartial, under the circumstances. The 
court held that to believe or not to believe such a juror 
became the problem of the judge. The court said that 
if the trial judge is persuaded that the juror will fair 1 y 
and impartial! y try the issue, his denial of a challenge 
for cause should not be disturbed except in the case of 
clear abuse of discretion. 
In addition to the above reasons for upholding 
the exercise of discretion by the trial Court it is sub-
mitted that appellant has failed to show that any prej-
udice resulted to him from the denial of said challenge. 
Subsequent to the examination of the ju,ror Wilson, 
appellant had an opportunity to use one of his per-
emptory challenges on said juror, but used it, instead, 
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on another. Appellant's only attempt at showing 
prejudice is the bare self-serving statement of counsel 
that in his opinion there were other more objctional 
jurors on the panel than Wilson. 
-Respondent has found no cases dealing with this 
question in which the counsel for the complaining 
party did not later exercise the peremptory challenge 
in striking from the panel the so-called objectional 
. JUror. 
In Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R. R., 112 
Ut. 189, 186 P. 2d 293, (1947), the juror in ques-
tion was the mother of one of defendant's witnesses, 
an adjuster who investigated the case. Under ques-
tioning from the Court she stated that she would be 
fair but naturally she was inclined to believe her son. 
A challenge for cause was denied, and the juror was 
later excused on peremptory challenge. The Court 
held that no showing was made at the time of choosing 
the jury that the plaintiff desired to use any more per-
emptory challenges and stated on p,age 19 5, 
''Should this Court now permit them to 
say they would have used a peremptory chal-
lenge on one of the remaining jurors had the 
trial Court excused Mrs. Hurd for cause? They 
make the contention in this Court that they 
would have done so, but to permit the ques-
tion now to be raised, would allow a party to 
willingly ,accept a jury before verdict and then 
claim error in the Court because of an adverse 
verdict. If an erroneous ruling on a challenge 
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for cause has the effect of depriving a party of 
a peremptory challenge, this Court will not re-
view the ruling unless the deprivation was of a 
challenge that the record affirmatively shows 
would have been used. To make this showing 
to the trial Judge before the jury is sworn is a 
burden we place on the complaining party." 
The Court goes to cite from the case of State V. 
Thorne, 41 Ut. 414, 126 P. 286, which case in turn 
cites from Thompson~ Merriam on Juries as follows: 
"Will the law presume prejudice from the 
simple facts that the peremptory challenges were 
exhausted: Some Courts answer this question 
in the affirmative; but, in the opinion of others, 
something more must be shown, namely, that 
after the peremptory challenges were exhausted 
some objectionable person took his place upon 
th jury, who would otherwise have been ex-
cluded by a peremptory challenge. The latter 
seems to be the better view. Conceding the chal-
lenge for cause to have been improperly over-
ruled, it is evident that only under such circum-
stances as just stated can the loss of peremptory 
challenge, necessary to cure the erroneous deci-
sion of the Court, be said to have worked- an 
injury to the challenging party.'' 
The Court goes on to refer to the case of State v. 
Cano, 64 Ut. 86, 228 P. 563. The record in that case 
showed that all objectionable jurors challenged for 
cause were later removed by peremptory challenges. 
The Court held that it was clear that no prejudice re-
. ~ - -
suited from any of the Court's rulings in regard to 
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denying the challenges for cause. The Court further 
cited the following language from the case of Frank v. 
U.S., (C. C. A. 9) 42 F. 2d 623. 
"If the defendant is dissatisfied with the 
jury or any member of the panel selected to try 
the case, he should manifest that fact to the trial 
Court, and in the absence of some objection or 
request to exercise an additional peremptory 
challenge, he ought not to be heard to complain 
upon appeal of an error which was corrected by 
his exercise of a peremptory challenge to the 
juror challenged for cause. If later he found 
that because he had thus cured the error of the 
trial judge, he would be forced to accept an ob-
jectionable juror whom he could not challenge 
for cause he should have called the attention of 
the trial Court to that fact. The injury to him 
was not sustained by the ruling of the Court on 
the challenge for cause. If he was thereby in-
jured it would be for the reason that after ex-
hausting his peremptory challenges he was 
thereby required to accept an unsatisfactory 
. '' JUror. 
It is submitted that in light of the above cases the 
appellant has failed to show any prejudice resulting 
from the denial, appellant had an opportunity to exer-
cise a peremptory challenge if he thou;ght the juror 
objectionable. This he failed to do and he thereby ac-
cepted the juror. Appellant's bare assertion that in 
the opinion of his counsel there were other jurors more 
objectionable than Wilson will not suffice to show 
prejudice. 
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In view of testimony of juror Wilson that he 
would try the case impartially, it is clear that the 
judge acted well within the bounds of his discretion 
in refusing to disqualify him for cause. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BECAUSE OF ANSWERS GIVEN 
BY JURORS IKEDA AND JENSEN ON 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. 
The Ikeda matter can be fully answered simply 
by referring to his absolute denial of the allegations 
made by appellant Geurts' nephew (R. 69). 
It appears that the judge either chose to believe 
Mr. Ikeda as against young Geurts or that such an 
innocent statement, if actually made, really was not 
prejudicial to appellant's cause. 
On voire dire examination, furthermore, juror 
Ikeda passed every test of his qualifications to try the 
case impartially. 
Appellant puts considerable stress on his allega-
tion that juror Jensen attended and participated in a 
certain hearing before the city commission dealing with 
an alleged shake-down involving the police depart-
ment. 
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The meeting is not shown by any fact or allega .. 
tion to have had any bearing whatsoever on appel .. 
lant' s troubles. As a matter of fact, Mr. Geurts was 
not the commissioner in charge of the police depart-
ment and had very little to do with it, the department 
being under the direction of Mayor Lee. 
Appellant talks about feelings running high as 
to commission members, but is unable to show, ap-
parently, any indication of feeling on the part of Jen-
sen against Mr. Geurts, personally. 
It may well have been that he was favorably dis-
posed toward Mr. Geurts, since the latter apparently 
supported Mayor Lee in many of the proceedings lead-
ing to the ouster of the chief of police. 
Moreover, the question posed by Mr. Rampton 
(A. B. -46) is very vague and uncertain at best and the 
logical import of it might well have been only as to 
protest meetings involving the ouster of the chief of 
police. 
Appellant's contention is too tenuous to be a 
basis for a new trial. This is especially so, in that ap-
pellant has been unable to show how any prejudice 
occurred in Mr. Jensen's participation on the jury. 
The citations from the legal texts cited below ap· 
ply to this problem: 
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31 Am. Jur. 125, 143: 
"False or misleading information elicited 
on voir dire examination results in an illegal 
verdict where it is of such character as to in.di-
cate probable bias on the part of the juror, but 
not where it is so insignificant as to indicate 
only a remote or speculative influence." 
38 A. L. R. 2d 627: 
"It is generally recognized that a false an-
swer on voir dire which has the effect of depriv-
ing counsel of the opportunity to make a proper 
determination whether to exercise the right to 
challenge a juror. will not in itself require the 
granting of a new trial. Most courts agree that 
to justify a new trial it must appear that the 
party seeking it has been prejudiced by the false 
,, 
answers. 
Both as to Points VI and VII generally, regard-
less of the type of proceeding this is deemed to be, 
Rule 4 7f ( 6), Supra~ applies. 
It is presumed that jurors having heard a case 
and delivered a verdict conducted themselves- prepe·rly 
and the presumption is not overcome except by some 
definite proof .of mi~corid_uct. Such pr_oof must be ad-
duced by the defendant and must be· of a convincing 
nature. Alerano v. Western Pacific,-5 --Ut. 2d 146, 298 
P. 2d 527; State v. Burns, 79 Ut. 575, 11 P. 2d··605. 
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POINT VIII. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
CERTAIN QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY. 
It is not readily apparent how the district attor-
ney's innocuous and almost rhetorical question could 
have done appellant any harm. 
Every honest person would have given the same 
response to Mr. Banks' question that Mr. Smith did 
and his answer was of no significance. 
Mr. Smith had succeeded in giving his estimate of 
the opinion held by the community as to appellant's 
character. His opinion was not shaken or challenged 
in any way by the offending question. 
As a strict matter of evidence, perhaps it was ill 
advised for the district attorney to ask the question 
just as he did. However, this court is not interested 
in technicalities, but only in seeing that substantial 
justice is done. State v. Neal, s~pra. 
Since no harm occurred, the point constitutes no 
cause for reversal. 
POINT IX. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF 
JUDGMENT. 
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The action brought by Mr. Banks as district at-
torney for the jurisdiction which includes Salt Lake 
City was entirely appropriate in every respect. 
The action is entitled ''Removal by Judicial Pro-
ceeding''. It appears as Chapter 7 of Title 77, U. C. 
A. 1953 and has been on our statute books since 1898. 
It has been employed from time to time to remove 
public officers from their positions for the commission 
of high crimes, misdemeanors or malfeasance in office. 
Paragraph 2 states that the action is to be init-
iated by an accusation in writing which "may be pre-
sented to the district court by the grand jury or by the 
district attorney, or by the county attorney of the 
county in which the officer accused was elected or ap-
pointed''. 
That this is a proper action is indicated in the 
opinion of this court in Geurts v. District Court, et al., 
------ Ut. ______ , 352 P. 2d 778, decided June 1, 1960. 
Appellant's claim that the indicated statute has 
been superseded by Rule 65B (b) ( 1) is unfounded in 
law. 
The rule dealing with quo-warranto merely gave 
expression to the common law right long in existence. 
That procedure has never been made exclusive and the 
statute is still fully in force. See State v. Barboglio, 
63 Ut. 432, 222 P. 904. 
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Moreover, quo-warranto traditionally has been 
the remedy for removing a person from an office which 
he attempts to exercise without right thereto. Its pur-
pose has not been the removal of one, who upon leg-
ally attaining to such office, thereafter performs acts 
that authorize his being removed by judicial proceed-
. 
tngs. 
In addition, Rule 81 indicates that the rules (i. e., 
65B (b) ( 1)) shall apply to· all special statutory pro-
ceedings, "except insofar as such rules are, by their 
nature, clearly inapplicable.,, (Emphasis ours.) 
Since this special statutory proceeding, still in 
force, declares that the action may be brought by the 
district attorney, it is clear that Rule 81 makes Rule 
65 inapplicable wherein it supposedly attempts to 
lodge exclusive responsibility for prosecuting removal 
proceedings in the Attorney General. 
Appellant has not been harmed through the ac-
tion brought by the district attorney and there is no 
prejudicial error present. Appellant's point, therefore, 
is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated and in light of the statutes, 
cases and texts set forth, the appeal of appellant 
Geurts is without foundation and should be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
JAY E. BANKS, 
District Attorney, 
Third Judicial District, 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON, 
Assistant District Attorney, 
Third Judicial District, 
Attorneys for R'espondent. 
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